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Exchange rate policy and the relative distribution of FDI 
among host countries 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the FDI-exchange rate nexus in the context of one FDI source and 
two host countries. It focuses on the effect of exchange rates on relative FDI inflows be-
tween the two host countries. The theoretical analysis shows explicitly that relative FDI 
inflows are a function of relative real exchange rates. In particular, if one host country de-
values its currency against that of the source country more than the other does, FDI into the 
former country will be expected to increase relative to the other country. The theoretical 
inference is examined with Japanese FDI in manufacturing industries of China and 
ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). The empirical results gen-
erally support the theoretical conclusion, suggesting that the real devaluation of the Chi-
nese Yuan undercut FDI into the ASEAN-4. 
 
Keywords: FDI, Exchange rate, China, ASEAN-4 
JEL classification: F14, F23, F31 
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Exchange rate policy and the relative distribution of FDI 




Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään suorien ulkomaisten sijoitusten ja valuuttakurssin yhteyttä 
tapauksessa, jossa suoria sijoituksia virtaa yhdestä maasta kahteen eri maahan. Mallissa 
käsitellään tapausta, jossa suhteelliset sijoitusvirrat näihin kahteen maahan riippuvat 
valuuttakursseista. Teoreettisten tulosten mukaan suhteelliset sijoitusvirrat ovat selvästi 
riippuvaisia kohdemaiden reaalisten valuuttakurssien kehityksestä. Jos yksi sijoitusten 
kohdemaa devalvoi valuuttaansa enemmän kuin toinen, se saa enemmän suoria sijoituksia 
kuin tämä toinen maa. Mallin teoreettisia tuloksia testataan aineistolla, joka käsittää japa-
nilaisten teollisuusyritysten suorat sijoitukset Kiinaan ja ns. ASEAN4-maihin (Indonesia, 
Malesia, Filippiinit ja Thaimaa). Empiiriset testit tukevat mallin teoreettisia ennustuksia, ja 
Kiinan juanin reaalinen heikkeneminen on vähentänyt suoria sijoituksia ASEAN4-maihin. 
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1  Introduction 
 
It has been recognized in the literature that exchange rates affect foreign direct investment, 
and the impact is significant, especially in the short-run. Empirical studies on FDI in the 
U.S. (e.g., Klein and Rosengren, 1994; Dewenter, 1995; Blonigen, 1997) conclude that the 
depreciation of the dollar substantially promoted FDI into the US. Studies (Goldberg and 
Klein, 1997; Bayoumi and Lipworth, 1998) emphasizing the experiences of Southeast 
Asian economies also show that bilateral real exchange rates are one of the FDI determi-
nants for those economies. Based on analysis of Japanese FDI in China’s manufacturing, 
Xing (2006) argues that the cumulative devaluation of the Chinese Yuan significantly en-
hanced Japanese direct investment into China.  
All of the theoretical studies on the nexus of FDI and exchange rates (e.g., Kohlha-
gen, 1977; Cushman, 1985; Froot and Stein, 1991; Benassy-Quere, 2001) concluded that a 
devaluation of the FDI host country's currency against that of source country will enhance 
inflows of FDI, through both the production cost and relative wealth channels. However, 
the existing literature concentrates solely on how exchange rates affect direct investment 
flows between FDI source and host countries and ignore the impact of devaluation on FDI 
into other host countries which compete for FDI from the same source. There is in fact no 
theoretical study that investigates the mechanism by which devaluation/revaluation of a 
FDI host country’s currency impacts FDI flows into its rival countries. 
Exchange rates influence not only FDI flows between source and host countries, 
but also the distribution of FDI among host countries competing for FDI from the same 
source country. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) usually invest directly in many foreign 
countries. Given other factors determining FDI, such as market size, growth, labour skills, 
political and economic stability and the regulatory framework constant, if a host country 
devalues its currency against that of the FDI source country by more than its rival coun-
tries, the devaluation will reduce its local production costs in terms of foreign currency 
more, thus making it more attractive for MNEs. In other words, from the point of views of 
foreign investors, the wealth and production cost effects associated with devaluation 
should be greater in the country which devalues its currency more, therefore strengthening 
its competitiveness for FDI and leading to a higher level of FDI inflows. 
Furthermore, when MNEs consider whether to relocate their production facilities or 
outsource their production, they compare not only their home countries with potential for-Yuqing Xing  
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eign locations but also all possible foreign countries with each other. If reducing produc-
tion costs is the major reason for transferring production facilities and investing directly 
abroad, the decision will be solely about selecting some locations from all possible foreign 
countries. Hence, currency devaluation or revaluation in one recipient country, says China, 
could alter relative comparative advantage between the potential host countries and thus 
change FDI flows to other countries, even if exchange rates remain unchanged between 
these other countries and the source country. Further, there is keen competition for FDI 
among developing countries. Exchange rate policy could explicitly or implicitly serve as 
an instrument to reinforce a country’s FDI competitiveness. Examining the competition 
between China and ASEAN-4 for FDI from Japan, Xing and Wan (2006) empirically show 
that the Chinese Yuan’s cumulative devaluation is one of the reasons causing the shift of 
Japanese FDI from ASEAN-4 to China. 
Early theoretical models are not generally suitable for analyzing such interactions 
between FDI recipients. Considering imperfect competition and product differentiations, 
Zhao and Xing (2006) use a three country model to analyze currency devaluation and 
global production allocations of MNEs and infer that global production allocation is influ-
enced by relative currency valuations, suggesting implicitly that FDI distribution may also 
be affected by the currency devaluation. Their study does not, however explicitly derive a 
direct linkage between exchange rates and FDI distribution over host countries.  This paper 
attempts to fill the gap in the literature. Within the framework of one FDI source country 
and two host countries, this paper investigates how the exchange rate policy of one host 
country impacts relative FDI between the two host countries. In addition, it provides em-
pirical evidence based on Japanese FDI in Asia.  The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 develops a model of FDI allocation and exchange rates. Based on the 
model, the relative FDI between the two host countries is derived as an explicit function of 
the relative real exchange rate. The econometric analysis for testing the conclusion of the 
theoretical model is presented in section 3. Finally, section 4 summarizes the major find-
ings of the paper and policy implications. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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2  A model of FDI distribution and exchange rates 
Assume that a Japanese MNE has one factory with capital stock 
0
A K in country A, and one 
factory with capital stock 
0
B K in country B, both producing homogeneous products for ex-
ports to Japan.
1 Assume that the production technology employed in these two factories is 
identical and is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function  
  y KL
α β γ = ,  
where y denotes output, K and L capital and labour inputs respectively, and ( ) 1 α β +<  
2 
The MNE plans to use direct investment to increase its total production capacity by  Q Δ to 
meet rising demand in Japan. Let  A k  and  B k  denote the additional FDI for the two facto-
ries. The optimal allocation of  A k  and  B k  between country A and B can be defined by the 
following cost minimization: 
  
 Minimize  /$ /$ ( )( ) yen A A A A A yen B B B B B e rk wL e rk wL ++ +   (1) 
 Subject  to 
00 0 ()() AAA BBB K kL KkLQ Q
αβ αβ γγ + ++ = + Δ  
where 
0 Q  stands for the original production capacity of the two subsidiaries;  A r  and  B r  are 
capital rents in countries A and B (measured in local currencies);  A w  and  B w  denote labour 
wages in the two countries (in local currencies); and  A L and  B L are the required labour in-
puts in the two factories. eyen/$A is the nominal exchange rate between the Japanese Yen and 
the local currency of country A,  $A, i.e. the yen-value of one unit of $A. Higher(lower) 
eyen/$A indicates appreciation (depreciation) of the local currency, $A. Similarly,  /$ yen B e  
represents the nominal exchange rate between the Japanese Yen and country B`s currency 
$B. It measures the value of $B in terms of the Yen. 
 
                                                 
1  The assumption of exports to other overseas market such as the USA or EU does not change 
the results 
2 If the technology is constant returns to scale, the MNE will produce only in the country with the lower unit 
production cost. If the devaluation of the other country makes its unit production cost lower, the MNE will 
allocate all its new investment to this country.     Yuqing Xing  
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Cost minimization renders the first order conditions (FOC) 
01
/$ ( ) 0 yen A A A A A er K kL
αβ λγα
− −+ =       (2) 
01
/$ ( ) 0 yen B B B B B er K kL
αβ λγα
− −+ =      (3) 
 
01
/$ ( ) 0 yen A A A A A ew K k L
αβ λγβ
− −+ =     (4) 
01
/$ ( ) 0 yen B B B B B ew K k L
αβ λγβ
− −+ =     (5). 
 








/$ log( ) log( ) log( ) ( 1)log yen A A A A A e wK k L λγβ α β =++ + − . (7) 
Using (6) and (7) to eliminate log LA, we obtain 
 
0
/$ /$ (1 )log( ) [(1 )log( ) log( )] A A yen A A yen A A K ke r e w M αβ β β −− + = −− + + , (8) 
where log( ) (1 )log log M λγβ α β β =+ −+.  
Similarly, it can be shown that 
 
0
/$ /$ (1 )log( ) [(1 )log( ) log( )] B B yen B B yen B B K ke r e w M αβ β β −− + = −− + + .   (9) 
 
 





(1 )log( ) {(1 )log( ) log( )}
yen B B yen B B AA
B B yen A A yen A A
er ew Kk
Kk e r e w
αβ β β
+
−− = − +
+
. (10) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 15/ 2006 
 
  11 
From equation (10), it is straightforward to derive the explicit relationship between relative 






log( ) (1 ) {(1 )log( ) log( )}
//
yen A A J yen A A J AA
B B yen B B J yen B B J
er r ew w Kk
Kk e r r e w w
αβ β β
− +
=− − − − +
+
, (11) 
where  J r  and  J w  denote capital rent and wage in Japan and  /$ ( / ) yen A A J e rrdenotes the real 
exchange rate between the Yen and $A, measured in capital prices. Similarly, 
/$ ( / ) yen A A J e wwdenotes the wage in country A relative to the wage in Japan. It is also the 






yen A A J
yen B B J
e rr
e rr
 is the ratio of real exchange rate between the Yen and $A to the real ex-
change rate between the Yen and $B.
3 Equation (11) shows that relative FDI in country A 
(in logarithm) is a decreasing function of (the weighted sum of) the two relative real ex-
change rates. The real exchange rate, as defined above, is widely used in the empirical lit-
erature. The equation (11) suggests that, as long as the currency of a recipient country ap-
preciates more than the currency of its rival country, its relative FDI will decrease and be 
diverted to its rivals.  
The weighted real exchange rate comprises nominal exchange rates, capital rents 
and wages. Changes in the real exchange rate can derive from any combination of those 
three variables: nominal exchange rates, capital prices and wages. Therefore, the impact on 
FDI due to differentials in capital rents and wages between two recipient countries is also 
incorporated into the model. We summarize the theoretical result in proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1  
If two countries compete for export-oriented FDI from the same source country and one 
country devalues its currency against the currency of the FDI source country more than its 
rivale does, its FDI stock will increase relatively. 
 
Without considering capital depreciation, FDI flows are the only variable leading to a 
change in the stock. Usually, concerns of the distribution of FDI among host countries 
                                                 
3  It is also the real exchange rate between $A and $B. Yuqing Xing  
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concentrate on FDI flows rather than FDI stock. It is convenient to express the similar rela-
tionship in terms of FDI flows. 
 
Corollary 1: 
If two countries compete for export-oriented FDI from the same source country and one 
country devalues its currency against the currency of the source country more than its 
riavle does, its FDI inflows will increase relatively. 
 
Proof: Suppose that country A devalues its currency to 
*
/$/ $ (1 ) yen A yen A ee δ =−  (01 δ << ) 
while country B holds its exchange rate at /$ yen B e . Let 
* * ( , ) A B k k  be the equilibrium distribu-
tion of the additional FDI at 
*
/$ /$ ( , ) yen A yen B ee and ( , ) A B k k the equilibrium allocation of FDI 












        (12) 











  .          (13) 
 




/$ /$ ( )( ) ( ) A A yen A A B B yen A B K ke r K ke r Q Q λα ++ += + Δ  (14) 
 
0* 0* 0
/$ /$ ( )( 1 ) ( ) ( ) AA y e n A A BB y e n A B K ke r K ke r Q Q δλ α +− + += + Δ . (15) 
 
Subtracting (14) from (15) yields BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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/$ /$ /$ [] () A A A yen A B B B yen B A yen A A A r kk e r kk e r K e r k δδ −= −+ +        .        (16) 
If
* 0 AA kk −≤ , we must have
* ( ) 0 BB kk −< , which contradicts to (13). 
 
Thus the only possibility is that 
 
* 0 AA kk −>  (17) 
As the capital to labour ratio in each factory depends only on wage and capital rent, and 
not the exchange rate, inequality (17) implies
*




0* * 0 ( )( ) ( )( ) AA A AA A K kL K kL
α βα β γγ +> + 
 
Considering the output constraint, it must be that 
0* * 0 ( )( ) ( )( ) BB B BB B K kL K kL
α βα β γγ +< + 
 
which implies that  
 
*
BB k k > . (18) 
 








>    (19) 
QED. 
Inequality (19) indicates that relative FDI flows is an increasing function of relative real 






yen A A J A




=  and '0 f < . 
 Yuqing Xing  
 
Exchange rate policy and 
 the relative distribution of FDI among host countries 
 
  14 
3 Econometric  analysis 
The simple theoretical model in section 2 shows unambiguously that relatively more real 
devaluation will stimulate more inflows of FDI. In this section, we use data to empirically 
appraise the theoretical result. In the empirical analysis, the FDI source country is Japan, 
and the host countries are China and the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand), which are the major recipients of Japanese FDI. The ASEAN-4 countries 
had been the major destinations of Japanese FDI. Since the middle of 1990s, however, the 
emerging China has replaced the ASEAN-4 as the most popular destination of Japan's di-
rect investment. Meanwhile China’s exchange rate regime and the exchange rate policies 
of the ASEAN-4 have experienced fundamental changes in the last two decades. The dy-
namics of FDI distribution between and the exchange rate policies of China and the 
ASEAN-4 provide a reasonable basis for the exercise. Moreover, Japanese FDI in 
ASEAN-4 and China has been export-oriented. Japanese affiliated manufactuers in those 
countries export more than 60 per cent of their products to overseas markets (Xing and 
Wan, 2006).  
Before we perform the econometric analysis, we utilize figures to scrutinize the 
possible correlation between relative FDI and bilateral real exchange rates. Figures 1-4 il-
lustrate the time trends of the relative Japanese FDI in China’s manufacturing industry 
compared with that in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand respectively, from 
1981 to 2003. In each figure, the ratio of annual Japanese FDI in China’s manufacturing 
industry to that of a particular ASEAN-4 country is depicted over the period.  In addition, 
each figure displays the dynamics of the corresponding real exchange rate index in the 
same period. For instance, Figure 1 shows the real exchange rate index between the Yuan 
and the Rupiah. A higher index number means depreciation of the Chinese Yuan against 
the currencies of ASEAN-4. All figures reveal that there exists a substantial correlation 
between relative FDI and the real exchange rate index. Real devaluation of the Chinese 
Yuan against ASEAN-4’s currencies was associated with rising relative FDI into China, 
and vice versa. 
Following the theoretical results in section 2 and the methodology applied by Xing 
and Wan (2006), we specify the following econometric model: 
  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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log( ) log( ) '
/
yen i i J Ji
t t it
JC yen yuan C J
ep p FDI
z
FDI e p P
α βγ ε − = ++ +      (20) 
where subscript C stands for China, J for Japan and i for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
or Thailand. FDIJi denotes Japanese direct investment in country i;  edenotes nominal ex-








yen i i J
t




, i.e. the relative real exchange rate,  is 
the focal point of the analysis. Its numerator is the real exchange rate between the Japanese 
Yen and the currency of an ASEAN-4 country, and the denominator the real exchange rate 
between the Japanese Yen and the Chinese Yuan. An increase in this variable means that 
the currency of a particular ASEAN-4 country appreciates relatively more against the Ja-
panese Yen than does the Chinese Yuan. Considering the complexity and duration of de-
cision making on FDI, we employ the one-period lagged value of the relative real exchan-
ge rate in the model. The underlying theory would predict that the coefficient of the relati-
ve real exchange rate is negative and significant.  
Structural variables, such as market size, GDP growth, openness, political stability, 
etc. are often emphasized as major factors determining FDI (Agarwal, 1980; Caves, 1982). 
To control for the effects of those variables on relative FDI inflows, we include in the es-
timations relative GDP, relative openness, GDP growth difference and a dummy variable 
for the impact of the Asian financial crisis. 
We estimated equation (20) separately for each of the ASEAN-4 countries. For 
each estimation, we used a panel data covering nine manufacturing sectors (food, textiles, 
pulp and paper, metal, chemicals, electronics, machinery, transport equipment, and others) 
for 1981-2003. Not all of the countries began to receive Japanese direct investment in 
1981, and the data availability over time horizon also differs across sectors. The number of 
oberservations varies across the countries. All FDI data are from monthly statistics pub-
lished by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Growth rate, GDP, and openness were ob-
tained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Real exchange rates were 
obtained from IMF’s International Financial Statistics and calculated by the author using 
nominal exchange rates and GDP deflators.  Yuqing Xing  
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Both fixed effects and random effects models are estimated for each of the 
ASEAN-4 countries, so that sector specific effects are taken into account. Table 1 tabulates 
the estimates of the fixed effects models and Table 2 those of the random effects models. 
The Hausman tests for comparing the random effects and fixed effects estimators were 
conducted for all estimates (Wooldridge, 2002).  The Hausman statistics indicate that for 
all countries the sector specific effects are uncorrelated with the other independent vari-
ables. The random effects models are better choices, and so the following discussion is 
based on the estimates of the random effects models. 







yen i i J
t
yen yuan C J
ep p
ep p
− for Indonesia is -0.91 and significant at 10 per cent; for Malaysia is -
2.68 and significantly at one per cent; for Philippines is -1.93 and significant at five per 
cent; for Thailand is -1.60 and significant at one per cent.  Those results imply that the 
relative real exchange rate is one of the significant factors determining relative FDI be-
tween China and the ASEAN-4.  For each ASEAN-4 country, FDI inflows from Japan 
were negatively affected by the relative valuation of its currency against the Chinese Yuan. 
In general, if the Chinese Yuan experiences a larger real devaluation against the Japanese 
Yen than did the currencies of the ASEAN-4, relatively more FDI will flow into China and 
less into Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Alternatively, if the currencies of 
the ASEAN-4 are devalued in real term more against the Japanese Yen than is the Chinese 
Yuan, China should expect to receive relatively less FDI. Consequently, currency devalua-
tion by a FDI recipient will affect not only its own FDI inflows, but also FDI into other 
host countries, even if the latter’s exchange rate with the currency of the source country is 
held constant.  Those results are consistent with the theoretical argument and provide em-
pirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
All variables except GDP growth in equation (20) are in logarithmic form. The es-
timated coefficients of the relative real exchange rate represent the elasticities of relative 
FDI with respect to the relative real exchange rate. Except for Indonesia, the responses of 
relative FDI between China and other ASEAN countries are elastic, especifically for Ma-
laysia. A one per cent real devaluation of the Chinese Yuan against the Malaysia Ringgit 
results in a relative 2.68 per cent increase (decrease) of FDI into China (Malaysia). For 
Thailand and Philippines, a one per cent real devaluation of the Chinese Yuan against their 
currencies would lead to 1.60 per cent and 1.93 relative decreases in their FDI inflows BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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from Japan respectively. Only for Indonesia, the responses are inelastic. A one per cent 
real appreciation of the Rupiah relative to the Chinese Yuan leads to a mere 0.91 per cent 
decrease in FDI flows from Japan to Indonesia. 
Regarding the control variables, the estimated coefficient of relative GDP is posi-
tive and statistically significant in all of the regressions, suggesting that relative market 
size also influences the distribution of FDI. Except for Malaysia, the estimated coefficient 
of the openness is positive and significant at five per cent, implying that a higher level of 
openness leads to relatively more FDI inflows. The GDP growth rate difference is signifi-
cantly positive at the five per cent level for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The esti-
mates are consistent with conventional theory of FDI: higher growth rates attract more 
FDI. However, it is difficult to explain why the GDP difference for Philippines is nega-
tively significant.  
The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable representing the Asian financial 
crisis is insignificant for Malaysia, indicating that the crisis did not mitigate Malaysia’s 
relative FDI inflows. It is noteworthy that the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
for Thailand is 2.13 and significant at one per cent and for Indonesia 0.35 and significant at 
10 per cent. The results indicate that, rather than dampened FDI inflows, the crisis actually 
enhanced the inflows for those two countries. The unconventional estimates could be ex-
plained by the “fire-sale” phenomenon (Krugman, 1998). Japanese MNEs invested rela-
tively more after the crisis to acquire cheap assets due to the sharp currency depreciation. 
On the contrary, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable is -1.02 and significant at 
10 per cent for Philippines, demonstrating that the relative inflow of FDI in the Philippines 
was weakened by the crisis. 
 
 
4 Concluding  remarks 
Within a framework of one FDI source and two host countries, this paper examines sys-
tematically how the devaluation/revaluation of a host country affects relative FDI flows 
between the two FDI recipients. The theoretical analysis reveals that relative FDI inflows 
are a function of the relative real exchange rate. Specifically, a host country devaluating its 
currency by more than its rivals against the currency of the source will receive relatively 
more FDI than the other host countries. This paper contributes to the existing literature on Yuqing Xing  
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the exchange rate-FDI nexus in two ways. First, it provides a new framework for analyzing 
the interaction of FDI and exchange rate policies of FDI host countries, rather than of FDI 
source and host countries. Second, it advances the existing literature by showing that the 
exchange rate policy of a host country not only influences its own FDI inflows but also 
FDI into other recipients, so that the FDI distribution among host countries is also deter-
mined by relative real exchange rates. 
Examining Japanese FDI in China and ASEAN-4, we found that, besides conven-
tional structural variables such as market size, GDP growth rate, openness, etc., the relative 
devaluation of the Chinese Yuan against currencies of the ASEAN-4 significantly im-
pacted the distribution of Japanese direct investment between China and the ASEAN-4. In 
particular, a one per cent real devaluation in the Yuan resulted in a more than one per cent 
drop in Japanese direct investment in Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The theoretical 
and empirical results of the paper suggest that the relation between exchange rates and FDI 
is multi-dimensional. The exchange rate policy of one FDI host country influences not only 
its own FDI inflows but also substantially affects FDI into other countries competing for 
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Table 1. Relative FDI and relative real exchange rate: Fixede effects models 
Dependent Variable:  / JiJ C FDI FDI  
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0.59 0.50  0.47  0.49 
F-value 18.36  11.40  7.69  11.17 
# of Obs.  177  163  128  179 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively; numbers in parentheses are 
t-values. All standard errors are estimated with the White consistent estimator. 
 
Table 2. Relative FDI and Relative Real Exchange Rate: Random Effects Models 
Dependent Variable:  / JiJ C FDI FDI  
Independent Vari-
ables 
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Adj. R-squared  0.37  0.34  0.23  0.48 
F-value 20.12  16.44  7.26  28.06 
# of Obs.  177  163  128  179 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance level at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively; numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
All standard errors are estimated with the White consistent estimator. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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